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I.

INTRODUCTION

Federal discovery reform is yet again at the forefront
of procedural debate. As has been said about personal jurisdiction,
discovery “used to seem so easy.”1 The original Federal Rules of

*
Associate Professor, The University of Akron School of Law. This article
benefitted greatly from the comments of Elizabeth A. Reilly. I also thank Marian J.
Kousaie for research support.
1. Lea Brilmayer, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1444, 1444 (1988); see also Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in
Discovery Reform and the Case for Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA.
L. REV. 27, 30 (1994) (concluding that “[t]he idea behind discovery seemed simple”
to Professor Sutherland, who wrote the first draft of the discovery provisions, and
George Ragland, whose work on discovery was important to Sutherland; “[l]awyers
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Civil Procedure, as adopted in 1938, were intended to minimize
procedural default and promote resolution of cases on the merits.2
The discovery rules had two oft-articulated goals—to assist in
ascertaining the truth and to permit courts to do justice.3 Pleading
was deemphasized, requiring only notice to the opposing party of
the conduct giving rise to the claim, with the majority of the sorting
of strong and weak claims to occur in discovery.4 The original
discovery rules enabled these goals by allowing parties to obtain
all relevant, non-privileged information before trial,5 but little
heed was paid to the costs that broad discovery might create.
The discovery provisions of the original Federal Rules played
an important role in the federal courts’ transition from trial
by surprise—the so-called “sporting theory of justice”—to trial on
the merits.6 As some concluded, the advent of discovery allowed
litigants in the federal courts to play their hands “with all the cards
on the table.”7
Those that sought to limit discovery under the nascent Federal
Rules claimed the Rules allowed fishing expeditions; however,
wanted to ‘hide the ball,’” but effective litigation and resolution of cases required
that parties share information).
2. See, e.g., Abraham E. Freedman, Discovery as an Instrument of Justice, 22
TEMP. L.Q. 174, 175 (1948); see also Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformity in Procedural
Rules and the Attributes of a Sound Procedural System: The Case for Presumptive
Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79, 88 (1997) (“The Federal Rule reformers wanted the
complete story to come out in litigation.”).
3. Alexander Holtzoff, The Elimination of Surprise in Federal Practice, 7
VAND. L. REV. 576, 577–78 (1954).
4. Id.
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (1970) (amended 1970) (deponents may be examined
“regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action”). In 1970, Rule 26(b)(1) was amended to provide
explicitly that this broad scope of discovery applied to all discovery devices. FED.
R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2010).
6. Irving Kaufman, Judicial Control Over Discovery, 28 F.R.D. 111, 115, 125
(1961); Holtzoff, supra note 3, at 576–79; Alexander Holtzoff, Origin and Sources
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1057, 1059–60 (1955);
Subrin, supra note 1, at 30.
7. Freedman, supra note 2, at 175; see also Edson R. Sunderland, Discovery
Before Trial Under the New Federal Rules, 15 TENN. L. REV. 737, 739 (1939)
(noting that discovery would result in each party’s “lay[ing] all his cards upon the
table, the important consideration [then] being who has the stronger hand, not who
can play the cleverer game”).
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courts and commentators alike concluded that discovery requests
were not “‘fishing expedition[s],’ if there appear[ed] any reasonable
possibility that there [might] be a fish in the pond.”8 Broad discovery
had become an essential element in the federal courts’ commitment
to doing justice.
The civil litigation landscape has changed dramatically since
the original Federal Rules were promulgated. Cases now vary
widely in size and in kind.9 Litigation and discovery strategies have
changed, trials are rare,10 and attorneys sometimes wonder if truth
can be defined in the litigation context.11 Even methods of creating,
saving, and using information have changed, resulting in an avalanche
of information that is available—in varying formats—for discovery.
Moreover, there is disagreement about the extent of discovery
costs: indeed, although it has been contended for decades that
discovery costs have soared, empirical research has established
that discovery costs are not “significant or disproportionate,” except
8. Freedman, supra note 2, at 175; accord Holtzoff, supra note 3, at 577–78
(“fishing is permitted if there is a reasonable prospect of fish being caught”);
Kaufman, supra note 6, at 115 (“[T]he federal rules authorize ‘fishing expeditions,’
so long as the fish may become bait with which to catch admissible evidence, and
so long as certain rules to prevent outrageously unsportsmanlike conduct are not
overstepped.”); see also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (discussing
the historical development of discovery, particularly how facts uncovered by one
party are subject to discovery from the opposing party).
9. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking:
Reflections on Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 601–02, 605–06 (2010) (offering a
number of explanations for the increased amount and variety of cases on the federal
docket); Richard Marcus, “Looking Backward” to 1938, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1691,
1695–1707 (2014).
10. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and
Democracy: Restoring a Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV.
399, 399–401 (2011) (narrating law firm’s shift from away from trial based
advocacy).
11. See Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical
Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 744 (1998)
(identifying, as a “conceptual flaw” in the outlook of the drafters of the original
discovery rules, that they “treated facts as if they were a static, knowable item to be
found[,] [with] discovery . . . compared to an x–ray that reveals the inner nature of
the body,” while “contemporary scientific and literary notions invite one even to be
suspicious that there are objective ‘facts’”).
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in a small number of complex, high-stakes cases.12 As it has
become apparent, however, that federal discovery will not and
perhaps should not provide for obtaining all relevant discovery in all
cases, the debate focuses on appropriate methods for calibrating
discovery.
The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (Advisory Committee) recently responded to
renewed contentions that discovery is often disproportionate to the
needs of cases filed in federal court in a manner consistent with
rulemakers’ responses since the early 1980s:
by proposing
amendments to the discovery rules13 and judicial-case-management
12. Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice
Reform: Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1088–89 (2012); see also
Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang, & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private Enforcement, 17
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 658 (2013) (discussing how empirical research over
the last 40 years has indicated that disproportionately expensive discovery is only a
problem in a small slice of litigation—high stakes, complex cases) (citing Robert
W. Gordon, The Citizen Lawyer – A Brief Informal History of a Myth with Some
Basis in Reality, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1169, 1199 (2009); Linda S. Mullenix,
Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the
Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1440–42 (1994);
Jordan M. Singer, Proportionality’s Cultural Foundation, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
145, 151 (2012) (discussing how empirical studies since the 1960s have found that
discovery is extensive and burdensome only in a small percentage of civil cases, and
the possibility that in a majority of civil cases, no discovery takes place at all);
Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Trans-substantive Procedure: An Essay on
Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 392 (2010)
(indicating that “[a]bout a half or a third of civil lawsuits (depending on the study)
have no discovery, and the cases that utilize discovery frequently do not have more
than two or three discovery incidents, perhaps a deposition or two and a set of
interrogatories.”).
13. The revisions include amendments to the following discovery provisions
of the Federal Rules: (1) Rule 26(b)(1) (amending, inter alia, the “scope” of
discovery to revise and relocate the so-called “proportionality” factors from Rule
26(b)(2)(C) to Rule 26(b)(1)); (2) Rule 26(c)(1)(B) (enlarging items that may be
included in a protective order to include “allocation of expenses” or cost–shifting);
(3) Rule 34 (specifying various changes when responding to discovery requests); (4)
Rule 37(a)(3)(B)(iv) (providing rule–based authority for an order to compel
production if “a party fails to produce documents” as requested); and (5) Rule
26(d)(2) (providing that parties may serve Rule 34 production requests before the
Rule 26(f) meeting between the parties). See Memorandum from Judge David G.
Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, to Judge
Jeffrey Sutton, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure on the
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, B-4 to B-11, B-30
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provisions14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The 2015
Federal Rule amendments (2015 Rule Amendments) became law
on December 1, 2015.15 The 2015 Rule Amendments include multiple
changes to the discovery and case management features of the Federal
Rules: (1) promotion of earlier discovery, which is intended to
permit more informed discussions between the parties at the Rule
26(f) conference and with the judge at the initial case management
conference, and to facilitate earlier judicial case management;16
(2) encouragement of direct communication between judges
and attorneys;17 (3) encouragement of greater cooperation by
parties in achieving Rule 1’s goals of “just, speedy, and inexpensive

to B-36 (June 14, 2014) (available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAnd
Policies/rules/Reports/ST09–2014–add.pdf)
[hereinafter
Judge
Campbell
Memorandum].
14. Rule 16 was amended to: (1) to encourage case management conferences
with direct exchanges between the parties and the judge; (2) to move forward the
time for the initial case management conference to 90 days after any defendant has
been served or 60 days after any defendant has appeared, absent good cause for a
later case management conference; (3) to add preservation of electronically stored
information and discussion of potential agreements under Fed. R. Evid. 502 to the
list of items that may be included in a case management order; and (4) to include in
the list of items for discussion at an initial case management conference the issue of
whether parties should be required to confer with the court before filing discovery
motions. FED. R. CIV. P. 16. Amendments to Rule 4(m) reduce the time for serving
the summons and complaint and to Rule 1 encourage cooperation among parties
during litigation. FED. R. CIV. P. 4; see Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note
13, at B-11 to B-13, B-21 to B-29 (discussing proposed changes to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure that emphasize that the initial case management meeting may be
conducted by any means of direct simultaneous communication; change the time for
holding scheduling conferences from 120 days to 90 days or 60 days after the
defendant has appeared; and change the time limit for serving the summons and
complaints from 120 days to 90 days).
15. The Supreme Court sent notices of its adoption of the amendments to
Congress on April 29, 2015. Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 575 U.S. __ (2015). See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1988).
16. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f); see Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13,
at B-11 to B-13.
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 16; see Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13,
at B-12.
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resolution of every action”;18 and (4) facilitation of greater
proportionality between the needs of a case and the permissible extent
of discovery through amendments to the scope-of-discovery provision
in Rule 26(b)(1).19
This Article focuses primarily on the fourth aspect of the 2015
Rule Amendments—the requirement that the parties or judges make a
“proportionality” analysis in each case to determine the scope of
permissible discovery. Amended Rule 26(b)(1) authorizes parties to
obtain discovery regarding “any non-privileged matter that is relevant
to any party’s claim or defense,” if that matter is also “proportional to
the needs of the case,” based on the following factors: “the importance
of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the
parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources,
the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether
the burden or expense of the discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”20
This amendment, combined with other amendments to Rule 26(b)(1),
completes the move in the federal courts from a default philosophy of
broad and liberal discovery to a landscape in which there is no default
or guiding principle, other than an open-ended appeal to
proportionality.21 The 2015 version of Rule 26(b)(1) requires
18. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. Rule 1 previously provided that the rules should “be
construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.” FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (2014). Rule 1 now
provides that “[the rules should] be construed, administered, and employed by the
court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding.” FED. R. CIV. P. 1. The Committee Note regarding
Rule 1 indicates that the changes are intended to encourage lawyers and parties to
cooperate to achieve the goals of a “just, speedy, and inexpensive” resolution of
actions. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-13. See generally
Robert G. Bone, Improving Rule 1: A Master Rule for the Federal Rules, 87 DENV.
U. L. REV. 287, 297 (2010) (concluding that Fed. R. Civ. P. 1’s principle of
achieving the “just, speedy, and inexpensive” resolution of cases provided
meaningful guidance when considered in the context of the goals and beliefs of the
original federal rulemakers, but that, in the modern litigation landscape, the
potentially conflicting goals of “just,” “speedy,” and “inexpensive” litigation require
trade-offs that the rule makers should address directly).
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13,
at B-4 to B-5.
20. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13,
at B-30.
21. See generally Philip J. Favro & Derek P. Pullan, New Utah Rule 26: A
Blueprint for Proportionality Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2012
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unelected federal court judges to make unguided policy decisions that
directly impact the winners and losers of the substantive claims before
them. Rule 26(b)(1) promotes proportionality but lacks the normative
guideposts that could instruct a judge’s proportionality decisions,
defaulting instead to a balancing-of-factors process that requires
parties or judges to balance various relevant factors but that provides
minimal guidance on the priority among factors or the weight to be
accorded to the factors.
I conclude that the policymaking required of judges to
determine the permissible scope of discovery under the
proportionality standard is at the boundaries of the institutional
competence of the federal courts, at variance with the separation-ofpowers instinct and requirement of the Rules Enabling Act,22 and may
decrease the deference due to substantive state law under the Erie
doctrine.23 The new proportionality standard24 permits and requires
MICH. ST. L. REV. 933, 975 (2012) (suggesting that federal rulemakers adopt
proportionality limits on the scope of discovery and that the proportionality
provision adopted in the Utah Civil Procedure Rules would provide a useful pattern);
Gordon W. Netzorg & Tobin D. Kern, Proportional Discovery: Making It the Norm,
Rather Than the Exception, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 513, 513, 528–32 (2010)
(advocating the elimination of the default of “broad and liberal” discovery and
replacing it with a “principle” of “proportionality”). But see Robert G. Bone, Who
Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961,
1990–96, 2016 (2007) (concluding that, when rulemakers delegate discretion to
judges to make procedural choices by balancing listed factors, the result may be an
“ad hoc weighing that lacks meaningful constraint and jeopardizes principled
consistency over the system as a whole,” unless the rulemakers also provide clear
guiding principles); David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of
American Law, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1191, 1222, 1228 (2013) (acknowledging that
federal courts have institutional limitations that prevent them from being able to, in
particular cases, make a contextualized cost-benefit analysis, measure results of
applying a substance-specific rule, evaluate normatively resulting data, or estimate
the probable results of applying substance-specific rules).
22. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–2074 (2014); see Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and
Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 693, 700–01 (1988).
23. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
24. Recognizing that “proportionality” factors have been included in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure since 1983, I, nevertheless, occasionally refer to
the proportionality balance required of parties and judges under Rule 26(b)(1) as
“new”. This is because the new positioning of the proportionality balancing factors
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judges to set different boundaries for different types of substantive
claims in individual cases. It thus requires judges to make normative
choices about the scope of discovery, based on the necessarily
incomplete information that will be available in the confines of federal
court litigation. Moving far from the neutral umpire analogy in which
a judge calls balls and strikes based on a standard strike zone,25 the
proportionality amendment to Rule 26(b)(1) essentially permits and
requires judges to create different discovery strike zones for each
batter—sometimes making the strike zone narrower than home plate
and sometimes constricting the height of the standard strike zone—
before ruling on balls and strikes. It, moreover, requires judges to
narrow the permissible discovery zone based on relative concepts of
“proportionality” that provide minimal normative guidance and based
on insufficient information.26 My call? “Just a bit outside”27 the
institutional capacity and role of federal judges—even for judges who
as part of the definition of discoverable matter, rather than as a limitation on
otherwise discoverable information, will in all likelihood result in that balance
playing a new and critical role in determining the extent of discovery. See Marcus,
supra note 9, at 1717 (discussing the increase in attention paid to proportionality,
and tracing it to rule changes and the difficulty of application); see also Bernadette
Bollas Genetin, Summary Judgment and the Influence of Federal Rulemaking, 43
AKRON L. REV. 1107, 1120 (2010) (observing, with respect to Rule 56 regarding
summary judgment, that when the text of the Rule provides a limitation, judges take
heed).
25. Major League Baseball defines its standard strike zone as “that area over
home plate the upper limit of which is a horizontal line at the midpoint between the
top of the shoulders and the top of the uniform pants, and the lower level is a line at
the hollow beneath the kneecap.” http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/official_info/umpires/
rules_interest.jsp. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 21, at 1972–73 (noting that the
“dominant paradigm of party-controlled litigation . . . envisioned a fairly limited role
for the trial judge as detached and neutral umpire and thus a limited domain over
which judicial discretion would operate”). But see Freedman, supra note 2, at 181
(federal trial judge was not to play the role of the neutral umpire, but was given
latitude to do justice in individual cases).
26. Bone, supra note 21, at 1990–96 (describing problems of information
access that hamper federal judges in attempts to create case–specific procedure);
Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic
Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 917–18, 926–30 (1999);
Marcus, supra note 21, at 1230–31; Singer, supra note 12, at 183. See also Bryan
L. Adamson, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) as an Ideological Weapon, 34
FLA. ST. L. REV. 1025, 1045 (2007) (noting that the appellate courts, rather than
district courts, are charged with norm declaration or norm elaboration).
27. MAJOR LEAGUE (Paramount Pictures 1989).
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have been granted a wide measure of discretion under the Federal
Rules.28
In Section II, this Article briefly examines the evolution of the
discovery rules since their adoption in 1938. In Section III, the Article
discusses the 2015 amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) and, in particular, the
relocation of the proportionality balancing factors to operate as part of
the definition of discoverable information under Rule 26(b)(1). It also
reviews other discovery-limiting amendments to Rule 26(b)(1).
Section IV then explores the institutional limitations of the federal
courts, concluding that the proportionality amendment to Rule
26(b)(1) asks judges to assume a role that is at odds with the federal
courts’ institutional competence and requires decision making that
may often exceed the federal judges’ normative lawmaking authority.
In Section IV, the Article also considers that the way forward may be
along a path that requires both (1) judicial decision making that
acknowledges the values embedded in existing law; and (2) additional
rulemaking that provides greater guidance regarding proportionality.
First, in making decisions regarding proportionate discovery, judges
should further the normative preferences of Congress and other
lawmakers in cases involving favored statutory claims29 and should
also promote rights otherwise recognized in the substantive law.30
28. E.g., Bone, supra note 21, at 1962, 1967 (concluding that “[c]ase-specific
discretion has been at the heart of the Federal Rules ever since they were first
adopted in 1938”); see also id. at 1968–70 (observing that the Federal Rules include
both explicit delegations of “broad discretion” and “vague language inviting case–
specific interpretation”); Subrin, supra note 1, at 35–36; Subrin, supra note 12, at
377, 382, 391.
29. See Subrin, supra note 12, at 400 (discussing Congress’s preference for
energetic enforcement of some statutes “by providing for multiple damages or fee
shifting for successful plaintiffs”); see also Burbank & Subrin, supra note 10, at
405–06, 411 (discussing Congress’s use of private enforcement actions to aid in
enforcement of important social goals and recommending that such actions be
exempted from any “simple track” procedural options which provide for lesser
discovery).
30. See Burbank, Farhang & Kritzer, supra note 12, at 644, 646–48 (discussing
the federal government’s increasing reliance on private enforcement in both
statutory and administrative law in four different periods—during and after the Civil
War; “during the Progressive Era, [bridging] the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries;” “during the Great Depression in the 1930s;” and “following the Civil
Rights and ‘Great Society’ period in the 1960s”—and suggesting that judicial action,
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Second, judges should articulate the rationale underlying their
proportionality decisions to, among other things, promote
development of the law regarding proportionality in discovery;
enhance appellate review of proportionality decisions; and provide the
necessary flexibility in proportionality decisions, while revealing the
extent of court adherence to normative preferences of Congress and
other lawmakers. Finally, the rulemakers should achieve the goal of
proportionality by providing greater instruction regarding application
of the proportionality factors or by creating a general set of discovery
procedures for most cases and supplementing the general procedure
with substance-specific protocols for selected substantive claims that
exhibit recurring discovery problems.31
II.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL DISCOVERY RULES

The original discovery rules were promulgated as part of a
procedural system whose drafters wanted the complete story of the
litigation to be told. The optimal procedural system, they believed,
should ensure that the party deserving to prevail on the merits would
prevail, whether the dispute was resolved through trial, settlement, or
including some case management tools, could “subvert the policy preferences of the
enacting Congress”); see also Marcus, supra note 21, at 1228–30 (noting that courts,
when creating substance–specific process law rather than following a general, transsubstantive rule of procedure, tend to resort to their own normative policy
preferences that may clash with existing preferences of Congress or that are, in any
event, “better left to coordinate branches”); Subrin, supra note 12, at 400.
31. E.g., Burbank, supra note 22, at 716–18; Burbank & Subrin, supra note 10,
at 409–10, 412; Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline,
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 547–48 (1986); Subrin, supra note 1, at 28–29, 45–56;
Subrin, supra note 12, at 399–405; see also Stephen S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal,
Four Years After Duke: Where Do We Stand on Calibrating the Pretrial Process?,
18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 643, 650–51, 654–57 (2014) (supporting the
proportionality balancing, but suggesting that it should be complimented by
“scheme–based reform efforts”); Singer, supra note 12, at 200–02. In fact, while
working on the 2015 Rule Amendments, the Advisory Committee worked with the
National Employment Lawyers Association and the Institute for Advancement of
the American Legal System to create discovery protocols for use in employment
cases alleging adverse action. Gensler & Rosenthal, supra, at 654–55; see also
Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-3 (discussing that these
protocols “include substantial mandatory disclosures required of both sides at the
beginning of employment cases”).
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otherwise.32 The original federal rulemakers, however, also aspired
to create a procedural system that was simple, uniform, and flexible
enough to apply to all cases, both legal and equitable.33 A byproduct
of these goals was the generality and trans-substantivity of the
resulting Federal Rules.34
To minimize technical default and, at the same time, facilitate
the resolution of cases on the merits, the original federal rulemakers
drafted rules that simplified pleading; established broad, partymanaged discovery; promoted liberal joinder of claims and parties;
and encouraged trial on the merits with the full facts.35 Indeed, the
watchwords of the original federal rulemakers were “generosity” and
“liberality,”36 which they achieved (in large measure) by giving
discretion to judges.37
The discovery rules, acknowledged by the rulemakers as
“revolutionary,” were an important element of the bold new
procedural system.38 Discovery would provide justice to those who
lacked evidence, permit parties to uncover the truth, and provide for

32. Subrin, supra note 2, at 88; Subrin, supra note 1, at 35.
33. Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1015, 1019, 1025–26 (1982); Bone, supra note 21, at 1971–72; Bernadette Bollas
Genetin, Expressly Repudiating Implied Repeals Analysis: A New Framework for
Resolving Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes and Federal Rules, 51 EMORY
L.J. 677, 690 (2002); Subrin, supra note 12, at 382.
34. Subrin, supra note 12, at 383, 385.
35. Subrin, supra note 1, at 30-32.
36. The rules made “generous and liberal provisions” for counterclaims and
cross claims; included a “liberal provision” regarding third–party practice;
contained, in Rule 16, “a device with magnificent potentialities” that would permit
the judge to “control[] the subsequent course of the action;” included, in Rule 18, a
joinder of claims provision that was “especially liberal;” and established ”generous”
rules relating to depositions and discovery that could be termed “revolutionary.”
Armistead M. Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L. REV. 261,
267–71, 275, 279 (1939).
37. Bone, supra note 21, at 1967–70.
38. Dobie, supra note 38, at 275; see also Sunderland, supra note 7, at 738–39
(noting that the original discovery rules permitted parties to seek “almost unlimited
discovery” and that, combined with pretrial innovations in the original Federal
Rules, “[t]hey mark the highest point so far reached in the English speaking world
in the elimination of secrecy in the preparation for trial”).
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resolution of controversies on the merits.39 Professor Stephen Subrin
has chronicled the narrowly circumscribed access to discovery in
American and British courts before the promulgation of the original
Federal Rules.40 He notes that Edson R. Sunderland, the principal
drafter of the discovery provisions of the original Federal Rules, drew
from discovery tools available in various states and ultimately
incorporated in the Federal Rules an amalgam of virtually every type
of discovery provision, often discarding constraints that limited a
particular discovery device.41 The resulting Rules included an
impressive array of discovery devices that were much broader in scope
than any existing state procedural system and were fully equipped to
meet the goal of uncovering the truth and facilitating resolution of
cases on the merits.42
The liberal discovery provisions of the original Federal Rules,
thus, exhibited the normative goal of achieving correct substantive
outcomes as well as the trans-substantive nature of the Federal Rules.
The discovery rules applied to all cases, regardless of subject matter
or case size, by relying on highly generalized rules that remitted many
procedural issues to the discretion of judges in individual cases.43 The
trans-substantive premise that discovery could be had regarding “any
matter, not privileged, which [was] relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action,”44 paralleled the general purpose of
the Federal Rules to enable the deserving party to prevail in the case.
39. Freedman, supra note 2, at 175; Subrin, supra note 11, at 716 (enumerating
the benefits claimed for broad discovery, which include: “elimination of surprise;
preserving testimony so it will be available in case of the death or other
unavailability of a witness; diminishing the importance of pleadings; increasing ‘the
effectiveness of the summary judgment’; focusing the trial on ‘the main points in
controversy’; and permitting each side to assess the strengths and weaknesses of
their cases in advance, frequently making trials unnecessary because of informed
settlement” (quoting Edson R. Sunderland, Improving the Administration of Civil
Justice, 167 ANNALS AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 60, 74–75 (1933)).
40. Subrin, supra note 11, at 694, 698–705.
41. Id. at 714–19; Subrin, supra note 1, at 30–33.
42. Subrin, supra note 11, at 719.
43. Bone, supra note 21, at 1972; Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of
Complexity—Complex Litigation: Cases and Materials on Advanced Civil
Procedure, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1473–74 (1987); Stephen B. Burbank & Sean
Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543,
1613 (2014).
44. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (1970) (amended 1970) (providing scope of discovery
for depositions).
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It also gave clear direction to district courts—judges were to enforce
broad discovery in all cases. The original federal rulemakers,
therefore, made the normative decision that courts were to provide
broad and liberal discovery sufficient to permit the uncovering of all
relevant, non-privileged information.
Broad discovery, moreover, gave primary emphasis to
enforcing the substantive goals of the governing law.45 In some cases,
the commitment to broad discovery increased the cost or length of the
case, but the original rulemakers apparently accepted such
consequences as appropriate costs of enhancing just outcomes.46 They
probably also thought that cases would remain relatively small, thus
limiting discovery costs.47 Notwithstanding a subsequent growth in
types and sizes of cases, the procedural system created under the
original Federal Rules, including its provision for liberal discovery,
worked relatively well through the 1970s.48
Increased litigation in the 1970s, largely based on use of the
statutory private enforcement provisions created by Congress and
class-action lawsuits made possible by the 1966 revisions to Rule 23,
however, resulted in calls to address the rising numbers of cases and
the supposedly excessive litigation costs.49 In response, in 1976,
Chief Justice Burger convened the Pound Conference, titled, “Causes
of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,” which
focused on overcrowded courts, excessive litigation, and the costs and
delays of litigation.50 The conference was a critical element of what
would later be referred to as the “counterrevolution of the late
45. See Bone, supra note 21, at 1981 (indicating that the “primary goal of
procedure is to produce outcomes that enforce the substantive law properly”).
46. See Bone, supra note 18, at 293 n.26 (discussing that the original
rulemakers might not have foreseen the broad discovery associated with complex
litigation and may have been content with expanding discovery because they
thought it would reduce costs by encouraging settlement).
47. Id.
48. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 45, at 1586–87 (noting that the
statutory private enforcement provisions and the broadened class action rule of 1966
led to increased litigation).
49. Id. at 1547, 1587–48, 1587–88; Carrington, supra note 9, at 601–02, 605–
06.
50. Reda, supra note 12, at 1091–92.
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[t]wentieth [c]entury’s discovery reform movements.”51 The 1970s
had brought claims of excessive litigation and discovery abuse, and,
as a consequence, the liberal discovery principle of the original
Federal Rules came under attack.52 The Pound Conference produced
a number of recommendations for improving litigation and provided
them to the “Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force” for further
refinement.53 The Follow-Up Task Force made recommendations that
would introduce “fundamental changes” into the justice system,
including recommendations to improve judicial case management and
restrict discovery in order to address the perceived problems of
excessive litigation costs and discovery abuse.54
Empirical evidence consistently establishing that discovery
costs were not excessive, except in a small group of complex, highstakes cases,55 did not dispel the notions of excessive discovery costs.
Thus, from the 1980s to the present, calls for litigation and discovery
reform spurred successive Federal Rule amendments aimed at
broadening judicial case management authority and restricting
discovery. In 1983, for instance, Rule 26(b)(1) was amended to add
the first “proportionality” limitations on discoverable information to
the Federal Rules. The proportionality factors were not included in
the definition of discoverable material, which continued to provide
that parties could obtain discovery “regarding any matter, not
51. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking:
Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 537–38 (2001).
52. Id. at 542–43.
53. William H. Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A
Blueprint for the Justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 279–
80, 288–90 (1977).
54. Reda, supra note 12, at 1094 (citing AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE
POUND CONFERENCE FOLLOW–UP TASK FORCE (1976), reprinted in 74 F.R.D. 159,
191 (1976)).
55. See, e.g., John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery’s Fatal Flaws,
84 MINN. L. REV. 505, 552 (2000) (“Discovery problems were . . . much more likely
to be reported in cases with higher stakes. . . . Where a lot of money is at stake,
where the issues involve personal injury or matters of principle, where the
relationships are contentious and the issues complex, here we see more discovery
and more problems with discovery.”) (quoting THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL.,
FEDERAL PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE: A CASE BASED NATIONAL SURVEY OF
COUNSEL IN CLOSED FEDERAL CIVIL CASES 21 (1997)); Amelia F. Burroughs,
Comment, Mythed It Again: The Myth of Discovery Abuse and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(1), 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 75, 75–76 (2001); Reda, supra note 12,
at 1088–90.
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privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action.”56 Instead, the proportionality factors were included
in a subsequent paragraph that permitted courts to limit the “frequency
or use of discovery methods” if it determined that certain discoverylimiting principles had been established:57
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery
methods set forth in subdivision (a) shall be limited by
the court if it determines that
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably
cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from
some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive;
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample
opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the
information sought; or
(iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome or
expensive, taking into account the needs of the
case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the
parties’ resources, and the importance of the issues
at stake in the litigation. The court may act on its
own initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant to
a motion under subdivision (c).58
Though these restricting principles permitted both increased
judicial discretion to manage cases and broader authority to limit
discovery, the provisions were rarely used. Commentators have
attributed the ineffectiveness of the proportionality factors to parties’
56. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (amended 1993).
57. Id.
58. Id. The 1983 amendments also added Rule 28(g), which provided that an
attorney’s signature on discovery requests, responses, and objections constituted
various certifications regarding the discovery, some of which paralleled the new
proportionality limitations, and which also provided sanctions for violations of the
certifications. Id.
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strategic reluctance to involve judges in discovery issues, the inability
of parties to convey complete information to judges about discovery
disputes, and the complexity of the proportionality factors, as well as
to insufficient information about the merits of the case at the time of
discovery.59 Additional changes seeking to curb discovery and
litigation expenses were implemented in 1993. For the purposes of
this Article, the most relevant change was the moving of the
proportionality limitations from their location in Rule 26(b)(1) to Rule
26(b)(2).60
In 2000, additional discovery amendments narrowed the
scope-of-discovery provision of Rule 26(b)(1). This time, the
narrowing was based on a proposal originally put forth by the
American College of Trial Lawyers in 1977 and subsequently
renewed by the American Bar Association Section on Litigation.61
Under this amendment, the scope of discovery that parties could
obtain without a court order was reduced from all non-privileged
matter relevant to the “subject matter involved in the action,” to all
information relevant to “any party’s claim or defense.”62 Under the
amendment, parties could still obtain information relevant to the
“subject matter” of the action, but only on motion and a showing of
“good cause.”63 This amendment, like other discovery amendments

59. See e.g., Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal But Could
Be Better: The Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE
L.J. 889, 905, 911–26 (2009) (concluding that proportionality balancing has not
worked well because the balance requires information about the merits of the case,
which is not available at the time that the judge makes discovery decisions and
which also cannot be communicated well to the judge); Singer, supra note 12, at
147–48, 180–86 (concluding that proportionality limits on discovery have been
ineffective because of the parties’ strategic reluctance to submit discovery issues to
judges; the “unavoidable information gap” that arises from the parties’ inability to
convey complete information about discovery disputes to judges; and the
complexity of the proportionality factors).
60. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2). Other changes included the addition of initial
disclosures to Rule 26(a)(1) and the inclusion of presumptive limits on
interrogatories and depositions. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a); FED.
R. CIV. P. 30(a).
61. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A Square Peg in a Round Hole?: The 2000
Limitation on the Scope of Federal Civil Discovery, 69 TENN. L. REV. 13, 15 & n.12
(2001).
62. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2010) (amended 2010).
63. Id.
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since 1983, sought to rein in discovery costs and provide greater
judicial supervision of discovery.64
Section III completes this review of the evolution of the
discovery rules by examining the 2015 amendments to Rule 26(b)(1),
which introduce proportionality balancing as part of the definition of
the scope of discovery and implement other changes that appear to
limit the scope of available discovery.
III.

CASE-SPECIFIC DECISIONS
CENTER STAGE

ON

PROPORTIONALITY TAKE

The 2015 Rule Amendments reveal the continued commitment
of the Advisory Committee to proportional discovery and early, active
judicial management of cases.65 A primary component of this
commitment is the amendment’s relocation of the existing
proportionality factors from Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) to the scope-ofdiscovery provision in Rule 26(b)(1).66 In a memorandum explaining
the proposals to return the proportionality factors to Rule 26(b)(1),
Judge David G. Campbell, Chair of the Advisory Committee on the
Rules of Civil Procedure, underscored that reasonable and
proportionate discovery has been a goal under the Federal Rules for
over thirty years.67 Indeed, Judge Campbell emphasized that “three
previous Civil Rules Committees in three different decades have
reached the same conclusion as the current Committee—that
64. Rowe, supra note 64, at 16. See also id. at 20–21, 24–27, 29–30
(concluding, based on then-available decisions, that discovery had not been
diminished appreciably by Rule amendments precluding “subject matter” discovery
absent a motion and showing of good cause because, among other things, of the
parties’ ability to plead claims and defenses on information and belief; court reliance
on material in the Committee Note that seemed to permit borderline issues to be
characterized as relevant to a claim or defense; the courts’ continuing reliance on
general principles of broad and liberal discovery; and the courts’ reliance on the
provision of Rule 26(b)(1) that permitted discovery of information “reasonably
calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence”).
65. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-4 to B-6.
66. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at
B-7 to B-8.
67. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-6.
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proportionality is an important and necessary feature of civil litigation
in federal courts.”68 In the 2015 Rule Amendments, the advisory
committee pursued the goal of proportionality by installing the
proportionality factors as “an explicit component of the scope of
discovery, [thus,] requiring parties and courts alike to consider them
when pursuing discovery and resolving discovery disputes.”69
In this Part, I acknowledge the importance of discovery that is
proportional to the needs of a case. I conclude, however, that the 2015
Rule Amendments remove the default of liberal discovery, and fail to
replace it with a guiding touchstone or clear principle for parties to
reference when negotiating discovery boundaries or for judges to
consider in making proportionality decisions.70 Rule 26(b)(1) thus
seeks to achieve discovery proportionate to the needs of each case by
permitting case-specific balancing. In doing so, however, it sacrifices
the use of either a trans-substantive background principle or a set of
guiding principles that could provide direction to parties negotiating
the extent of discovery and to judges making proportionality decisions
and which could also counterbalance the federal courts’ institutional
limitations when required to craft case-specific procedures.71 In Part
68. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-8.
69. Id.
70. Although I concentrate primarily on the incompatibility of the balancing
test with the institutional competence of federal court judges, I note as well that the
absence of a normative decision, or set of decisions, by the Advisory Committee
establishing a default or a set of guidelines for making the proportionality
calculation, means that parties, who will also be in the trenches in determining the
proportionality issue, have no baseline for negotiating the scope of discovery. See,
e.g., Subrin, supra note 2, at 89–90, 94 (discussing the importance to parties of
predictability of discovery); Singer, supra note 12, at 181–84 (defining
predictability as a core value of civil litigation). Likewise, Professor Bone has
concluded that Rule 1, which is “meant to guide [the trial judge’s] discretion in
socially productive ways,” has today become vague and misleading because it fails
to make the value choices that could provide guidance to judges regarding whether
and when to pursue the conflicting goals of just outcomes, speed, and inexpensive
litigation. Bone, supra note 18, at 288–89, 292–97.
71. Marcus, supra note 21, at 1195, 1228–33 (recognizing that transsubstantive procedural rules provide a means of counterbalancing the institutional
limitations of the federal courts, including limitation of lawmaking authority,
competence (including the ability to obtain complete information and evaluate it
empirically), and uniformity); see also Burbank, supra note 45, at 1473–76 (noting
that the case-specific approach encompassed in the new trend for the rules of
procedure does not produce a higher likelihood that the party’s substantive rights
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III(A), I discuss the amendment to insert case-specific balancing of
proportionality factors as the primary determinant of the scope of
discovery, and in Part III(B), I discuss other changes to Rule 26(b)(1)
that narrow discovery.
A.

Proportionality Returns to Rule 26(b)(1)

The Advisory Committee correctly highlights that
proportionality in discovery has been pursued by federal rulemakers
in three previous decades.72 The Committee Note, however, spends
more time establishing that using proportionality factors to define the
scope of discovery is not new, than it spends justifying the
appropriateness of limiting discovery scope through case-specific
balancing of multiple factors.73 In Part III(A)(1), I discuss the
Advisory Committee’s purpose for relocating the proportionality
standard to Rule 26(b)(1). In Part III(A)(2), I focus on the textual
changes and the explanatory material regarding proportionality in the
Committee Note.
1.

Proportionality in Discovery:
1983 to the Present

The Committee Note points out that in 1983, federal
rulemakers added the proportionality factors to Rule 26(b)(1), which
ultimately came to be referred to as the “proportionality rule.”74
Intended to reduce “overdiscovery” and “redundant or
will be achieved). Some commentators also favor dispensing with the transsubstantive principle for discovery and replacing it with a set of procedures that
cover a wide range of cases that would then be supplemented by additional
substance–specific protocols. See supra note 44 (explaining the need to supplement
discovery rules with substantive-specific protocols to truly achieve proportionality).
This combination of discovery practices would also provide policymaking restraint
on judges’ discovery decisions and address the institutional limits of the federal
courts.
72. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-7, B-16 to B-19
(providing the text of the amended Committee Note, which traces the history of the
proportionality factors in the discovery rules).
73. Id.
74. Id.; Singer, supra note 12, at 179.
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disproportionate discovery” as well as “to encourage judges to be
more aggressive in identifying and discouraging discovery overuse,”75
the 1983 proportionality factors permitted courts to limit discovery
upon determining that “the discovery [was] unduly burdensome or
expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in
controversy, limitations on the parties’ resources, and the importance
of the issues at stake in the litigation.”76
In an ensuing reorganization of Rule 26(b) in 1993, these
proportionality factors were moved from Rule 26(b)(1) to Rule
26(b)(2)(C)(iii).77 The 1993 amendments also added two new
factors—“whether ‘the burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit’ and ‘the importance of the proposed
discovery in resolving the issues.’”78 Additionally, the 1993
Committee Note stressed the continued importance of proportionality
in limiting discovery, providing that “the revisions in Rule 26(b)(2)
are intended to provide the court with broader discretion to impose
additional restrictions on the scope and extent of discovery.”79
By 2000, the Advisory Committee came to believe that courts
were not using the proportionality “limitations” as contemplated80 and
added a sentence in Rule 26(b)(1) to alert litigators and courts to the
existence of the proportionality factors and to highlight their
importance in determining appropriate limits on discovery.81 Despite
these efforts, survey results of attorneys and judges shared at the 2010
Duke Civil Litigation Conference82 led the Advisory Committee to
75. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-7, B-37 to B-38.
76. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (1993) (amended 1993); see also Judge Campbell
Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-37 (discussing the intent and substance of the
1983 provisions).
77. Id.
78. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-7.
79. See id. (discussing the 1993 revision of Rule 26(b)(2)).
80. Id.; accord Moss, supra note 62, at 905; Singer, supra note 12, at 180–88.
81. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2000) (amended 2000) (adding the following text
to Rule 26(b)(1): “All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule
26(b)(2)(C)”); see also Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-7, B-19,
B-39 (discussing the purpose of the 2000 Rule 26 amendment).
82. The Advisory Committee organized a Conference on Civil Litigation that
was held at Duke University Law School and has come to be called the “Duke
Conference.” The purpose of the conference was to seek “better means to achieve
[Fed. R. Civ. P.] 1’s goal of just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action.” Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-1 to B-2; see also
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conclude that additional proportionality in discovery was needed and
that returning the proportionality factors to Rule 26(b)(1) and making
other amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) would improve discovery.83
These survey results seem contrary to consistent empirical studies
revealing that discovery is not disproportionately costly, except in a
small percentage of high-value, complex cases.84
2.

Proportionality as the Primary
Constraint on Discoverable
Matter

As noted above, the 2015 Rule Amendments return the
proportionality factors to Rule 26(b)(1) and insert the factors as an
element of the definition of the scope of discoverable matter in order

Gensler & Rosenthal, supra note 33, at 645, 647–50 (discussing the goal of the Duke
Conference). The Advisory Committee ultimately reported “near–unanimous
agreement . . . that the disposition of civil actions could be improved by advancing
cooperation among parties, proportionality in the use of available procedures, and
early judicial case management.” Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at
B-2. The Advisory Committee ultimately created two subcommittees, including the
“Duke Subcommittee” that was charged with considering recommendations
resulting from the 2010 Duke Conference. Id. The Advisory Committee developed
proposed amendments with the assistance of the Duke Subcommittee, which
included (1) proposed numerical limits on discovery that were later withdrawn; (2)
proposed amendments to Rule 26(b)(1); (3) recognition in Rule 26(c)(1) that “the
allocation of expenses” may be included as a term of a protective order; (4)
amendments to Rule 34 regarding “specificity” of objections to requests for
production of documents or electronically stored information, a provision
specifically permitting parties to produce copies of documents or ESI and a
requirement that parties state whether they are withholding documents based on
objections made; (5) a provision for early discovery requests; and (6) amendments
to Rules 4 and 16 to permit earlier judicial case management. Id. at B-4 to B-14.
83. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, B-6 to B-7. See also Gensler
& Rosenthal, supra note 33, at 645–66 (concluding that the Duke Conference
resulted in “clear and broad consensus,” based on complaints regarding the length
and cost of cases, that procedure should be changed to “increase judicial engagement
and supervision in the cases that need it, when it is needed”).
84. See supra note 12 (citing multiple sources of empirical research on the cost
of discovery).
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to increase proportionality and enhance judicial management.85
Interestingly, neither the Rule text nor the Committee Note reference
discovery costs or discovery abuse as a basis for making the
proportionality factors a critical component of the scope of
permissible discovery. Instead, the Committee Note indicates that
proportionality itself has become the goal.86
“Proportional”
discovery, however, embraces two elements – (1) normative standards
defining the desired balance between substantive justice and efficient
and cost-effective discovery (or other procedural goals); and (2) a
process for attaining the desired normative standards.
The
amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) do not articulate the normative
standards for achieving proportional discovery, but provide only a
process—the balancing of proportionality factors—for determining
whether to permit discovery. Rule 26(b)(1), thus, requires parties and
judges, in each case, to first make unguided value choices about
whether to privilege substantive outcomes or less costly litigation (or
other procedural goals) and then to use the results of that value
determination to guide decisions regarding the extent of permissible
discovery.
Under Rule 26(b)(1), the scope of permissible discovery will
be measured by whether the material is relevant, non-privileged, and
“proportional to the needs of the case,”—considering the following
factors:
85. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at
B-8 (concluding, as part of the basis for returning the proportionality factors to Rule
26(b)(1), that “proportionality is an important and necessary feature of civil
litigation in federal courts. . . . [but it] is still lacking in too many cases.”); see also
Gensler & Rosenthal, supra note 33, at 647–48 (noting the general belief that the
rules themselves are sound, but in practice, their application could be more
consistent).
86. See supra notes 80–84, and accompanying text. The Advisory Committee
Report dated June 14, 2014, emphasizes proportionality as the goal of discovery.
See Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-2 to B-3, B-5 to B-6
(indicating the conclusion in reports prepared for the Duke Conference:
“[p]roportionality should be the most important principle applied to all discovery”
and that three prior Advisory Committees had concluded that “proportionality is an
important and necessary feature of civil litigation in federal courts”). The only
suggestions that the purpose of proportionality standard is to control discovery costs
or respond to discovery abuse appears in instances in which the Committee Note
references or quotes prior Committee Notes that accompanied previous discovery
Rule Amendments. Id. at B-37 to B-39, B-41.
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(1)

the importance of the issues at stake in the action;

(2)

the amount in controversy;

(3)

the parties’ relative access to relevant information;

(4)

the parties’ resources;

(5)

the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues;
and

(6)

whether the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit.87

Combined with other 2015 amendments to the scope-ofdiscovery provision,88 Rule 26(b)(1) completes the elimination of the
default discovery principle of broad and liberal discovery that was
established with the adoption of the original Federal Rules. The
amendment substitutes proportionality for substantive outcomes as the
normative principle of highest priority, but neither the text of Rule
26(b)(1) nor the Committee Note supplies a normative default
principle to govern the proportionality balance in most cases or even
87. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1), see Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13,
at B-8. Rule 26(b) provides as follows:
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the
scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s
claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering
the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in
controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the
parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the
issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit.
This amended language includes one new proportionality factor—“the parties’
relevant access to relevant information.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see Judge
Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-8.
88. See infra notes 113–126, and accompanying text.
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a subset of cases. Thus, the definition of discoverable matter lacks
the predictability that many conclude is vital to discovery.89 It is
possible to view the proportionality amendment and other 2015 Rule
Amendments that slim the text of Rule 26(b)(1) and the scope of
discovery as creating a default of less discovery.90 The proportionality
limits were certainly born of a conviction that their consistent
application would limit discovery abuse and, thus, discovery costs.91
They have been nurtured over the years by continued contentions that
judicial case management, including judicially-set, case-specific
discovery limits, would curb high discovery costs and discovery
abuse.92
Nevertheless, neither the text of Rule 26(b)(1) nor the
Committee Note supplies an explicit default to less discovery. To the
contrary, the text provides factors that may tug toward either more or
less discovery (or in both directions), given the context of the case.
This explicitly remits the decision regarding breadth of discovery to
trial courts (and, of course, to the negotiating strength of litigating
parties) in particular cases. In this way, the proportionality standard
invites district court judges to make normative decisions about the
claims at issue. For example, in a given case, the first factor—“the
importance of the issues at stake in the action”—may conflict with the
second, “the amount in controversy.” A judge must determine
whether the issues are important, and, if so, how important. The judge
must then weigh that level of perceived importance against the amount
in controversy, and, of course, must determine whether that amount is
high, low, or somewhere in between. Opinions will differ. Indeed,
the determination of the importance of the issue involves a judicial
policy determination regarding the importance of particular

89. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 26, at 918; (criticizing the management model
for its failure to sufficiently defend the strength of trial judges’ procedure-making
abilities); Subrin, supra note 2, at 89–90, 94 (discussing the importance to parties of
predictability of discovery); Singer, supra note 12, at 181–84.
90. See infra notes 113–126, and accompanying text.
91. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-8. See also Singer,
supra note 12, at 177–78 (discussing the goals associated with revising the
proportionality factors from the Rules).
92. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-8; see also Burroughs,
supra note 58, at 83–84 (noting that, except in a rare number of high stakes cases,
discovery expenses are generally not excessively high).
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substantive claims, and the weighing of issue “importance” against
amount in controversy involves another value determination.93
Discussion of the potential conflict between these two factors
in the 2015 Committee Note restates the “caution” of the 1983
Committee Note that “monetary stakes are only one factor” for courts
to consider and underscores the substantive impact that scope-ofdiscovery decisions may have.94 The 1983 Committee Note
emphasized that, in addition to the monetary stakes at issue, judges
must consider various other measures of issue importance:
[T]he significance of the substantive issues, [may be]
measured in philosophic, social, or institutional terms.
Thus the rule recognizes that many cases in public
policy spheres, such as employment practices, free
speech, and other matters may have importance far
beyond the monetary amount involved.95
The 2015 Committee Note adds to that caution, recognizing
that “[m]any other substantive areas also may involve litigation that
seeks relatively small amounts of money, or no money at all, but that
seeks to vindicate vitally important personal or public values.”96
Thus, the 2015 version of Rule 26(b)(1) and the 2015 Committee Note
93. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-41 to B-42; see
Burbank & Subrin, supra note 10, at 405–06 (emphasizing the “attack on democracy
[that] results from [procedure that] undercut[s] the effectiveness of congressional
statutes designed to compensate citizens for injury or to enable private enforcement
of important social norms”); Jonah B. Gelbach & Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law and
Economics of Proportionality in Discovery 16–17 (Univ. of Pa. Inst. For Law &
Econ., Research Paper No. 15-1, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2551520 (offering suggestions for judges in weighing relative factors);
Moss, supra note 62, at 912–13 (suggesting that the “amount in controversy” and
“importance of the issues” analysis are uncertain at the time of any decision under
the proportionality rule); Singer, supra note 12, at 180–86 (noting that the
unpredictability of proportionality determinations complicate the analysis of the
utility of the proportionality rule); see also John L. Carroll, Proportionality in
Discovery: A Cautionary Tale, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 455, 464–66 (2010)
(suggesting that proportionality is underutilized).
94. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-8, B-41 to B-42.
95. Id. at B-41 to B-42.
96. Id.
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suggest that, in cases involving “philosophic, social, or institutional”
issues and in cases seeking to “vindicate vitally important personal or
public values,” the importance of the issues at stake may outweigh the
monetary stake and, presumably, other factors.97 Neither, however,
requires this balance for any particular substantive claim, ostensibly
leaving the decision to the unguided discretion of each district court
judge and the parties in each case, though these are the precise types
of value judgments that vary by individual judge and on which the
parties generally assume diametrically-opposed views.
The Rule or the Committee Note should have established
normative guidelines, balancing priorities, or more helpful factors to
prevent judges from encroaching on the substantive prerogatives of
Congress or state policymakers. For instance, for cases in which
Congress has created “statutory fee-shifting or damage-enhancement
provisions,”98 Congress has indicated a normative commitment to the
substantive claim at issue and has indicated, moreover, that costs
should not be the overriding consideration. The Rule text or
Committee Note could have indicated, in these cases, that courts
should default to permitting discovery of all non-privileged matter
relevant to the claim or defense of any party (or to the subject matter
of the claims in the action), thus, explicitly indicating a high level of
deference to congressional policy determinations and removing the
burden of the initial value choice before proportionality balancing.99
Such a guideline would have left ample room for case-based discretion
under proportionality balancing, but would have (1) relieved the
federal district courts, which have limited substantive lawmaking
authority, from having to make normative discovery decisions that
could undermine congressional policy choices, and (2) facilitated
97. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-41 to B-42.
98. See supra notes Error! Bookmark not defined. to Error! Bookmark not
defined., and accompanying text.
99. See Stephen B. Burbank, Proportionality and the Benefits of Discovery:
Out of Sight and Out of Mind?, 34 REV. LITIG. 647, 654 (2015) (expressing concern
that the the 2015 Rule Amendments could lead to an emphasis of cost over benefits);
Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 96, at 6; see also Subrin, supra note 12, at 400
(suggesting that drafters should consider parties’ time limitations); Burbank &
Subrin, supra note 10, at 405–06, 411 (2011) (discussing Congress’s use of private
enforcement actions to aid in enforcement of important social goals and
recommending that such actions be exempted from any “simple track” procedural
options that provide for lesser discovery).

Symposium 2015] PROPORTIONALITY AND DISCOVERY

681

increased uniformity for claims that Congress has identified as
favored.
Further, even assuming that the importance-of-the-issues
factor and the amount-in-controversy factor were aligned or were
otherwise determined to favor broad or relatively broad (whatever that
compromise might mean) discovery, courts might conclude that other
factors listed in the Rule 26(b)(1) proportionality balance favor lesser
discovery, such as the extent of “the parties’ resources,” the
“importance of the discovery in resolving the issues,” or “whether the
burden or expense of discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”100 In
fact, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues would
seem to be quite important in resolving proportionality issues. As is
discussed below, however, complete information on this factor will be
hard to obtain because, among other factors, parties often lack
information early in the case and fail to realize the full importance of
the information they do have. These additional factors may point in
different directions in any single case. The 2015 Committee Note,
however, sheds little light on the priority or weight to be accorded to
these factors or on the situations in which each should be considered
more highly.101

100. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
101. With respect to the “extent of resources” factor, one would generally
expect that discovery should be commensurate with resources under a
proportionality principle, but the Committee Note hastens to provide also that
discovery may be directed “to an impecunious” party and that discovery directed to
“a wealthy party” would not be “unlimited.” Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra
note 13, at B-42. With respect to the importance of the discovery in resolving issues
in the case, the Committee Note indicates that the producing party may not have
information about the importance of the discovery, but it does not address the very
common circumstance in which a requesting party may not have a full appreciation
of the uses for the discovery until he receives the discovery or until later in the case.
See id. at B-42. Similarly, the Committee Note acknowledges, with respect to the
burden or expense of discovery, that this information may not be available at the
beginning of the case, and that the responding party may have the only information
about this factor. See id. at B-40. But, the Committee Note makes no reference to
the recognized inclination of parties to withhold information, especially before
access to discovery can level the information playing field. See infra notes 140–141,
and accompanying text.
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The Committee Note does, by contrast, provide relatively clear
guidance regarding the parties’ “relative access to relevant
information,” a new factor that provides “explicit focus” on cases
involving “information asymmetry.”102
The Committee Note
indicates that in some cases, one party will have large amounts of
information, while the other party has limited information.103 The
Committee Note acknowledges that some of the information may be
easily accessed while some may be more difficult to access, and
concludes simply that “these circumstances often mean that the burden
of responding to discovery lies heavier on the party who has more
information.”104 The Committee Note carefully leaves the decision
for individual cases, but the clear import is that in most cases involving
information asymmetry, the party lacking information should be
permitted significant discovery.
Further hindering a district court in making the proportionality
analysis are the following considerations: parties may have imperfect
information regarding the factors, may not comprehend fully the
import of the information in the initial stages of discovery, and will
often evaluate each factor differently, arguing for contradictory
conclusions on each factor.105 The 2015 Committee Note, again,
provides little direction on how to ameliorate these imbalances and
differences, concluding, instead, that it will be “[t]he court’s
responsibility, using all the information provided by the parties, . . . to
consider . . . all the . . . factors in reaching a case-specific
determination of the appropriate scope of discovery”106 and that the
“burden or expense of proposed discovery should be determined in a
realistic way.”107
In short, the 2015 Committee Note is careful not to urge
limited discovery or to premise the proportionality balance on an
intent to curb either discovery abuse or excessive costs in discovery.
Instead, it steadfastly remits decisions on discovery scope to a
determination of proportionality in the context of each particular case.
102. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-40.
103. Id.
104. Id. at B-40 to B-41 (emphasis added).
105. See Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 96 at 13 (recognizing that courts
will have to make difficult judgment calls as to the assignment of weight for more
subjective factors); see also infra notes 139–142, and accompanying text.
106. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-40.
107. Id. at B-42.
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The benefit of the proportionality standard is that it permits district
court judges to create reasonable, case-specific discovery boundaries.
This coincides with Professor Subrin’s observation that one discovery
size does not fit all.108 The disadvantages of the proportionality
principle are (1) that it permits judges to privilege either the
substantive claim at issue or fiscal factors over substantive interests;
and (2) that, given the institutional limitations of the federal courts,
which I discuss below,109 district court judges may not be particularly
good at making these case-specific determinations.
In summary, instead of serving as a means to an articulated
procedural goal or value, “proportionality”—which privileges casespecific discretion—has itself become the goal of Rule 26(b)(1).
Indeed, the Advisory Committee Report concludes that “[s]ince the
[Duke] conference, the Committee and others have sought to promote
cooperation, proportionality, and active judicial case management.”110
More emphatically, the Advisory Committee reported at the
conclusion of the Duke Conference that “[p]roportionality should be
the most important principle applied to all discovery.”111 Of course,
cooperation, proportionality, and active case management may be
goals in themselves. Conversely, they may be a means of achieving
other desired objectives of litigation, such as efficient and costeffective litigation in federal courts for the litigating parties, or
sufficient evidence production to ensure that the proper party prevails.
As used in support of procedural goals like these, the terms
“cooperation,” “proportionality,” and “active case management”
would provide some guidance.
When used as the goal itself, a requirement that discovery be
“proportional” based on factors that may cut in different directions in
different cases reduces, at best, to a requirement that discovery be
reasonable, and, at worst, to unguided discretion to privilege cost
considerations, substantive outcomes, or other procedural values.
108. Subrin, supra note 12, at 378 (concluding that the trans-substantive
discovery model should be “readjusted” and suggesting a “simpler procedural track
for some cases and non-binding protocols for discovery and other procedural
incidents for some of the more expansive and expensive case-types”).
109. See infra notes 127–138 and accompanying text.
110. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-2 to B-3.
111. Id. at B-6.
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Reasonable or “proportional” discovery is a worthy goal, but, unlike
the clear discovery objective in the original Federal Rules,112 it is not
one that provides the parties or federal judges with an understanding
of the guiding procedural values and, thus, of the conduct required or
the types of orders that should issue in the varying types of claims
filed in federal courts.
B.

The 2015 Amendments to Rule 26(b)(1)
Eliminate Remaining Imprints of Liberal
Discovery

In addition to installing proportionality as the principal
determinant of the scope of discovery, the 2015 amendments to Rule
26(b)(1) eliminate the remaining vestiges of the liberal discovery
principle by removing or modifying three provisions of the former
Rule 26(b)(1) that could support a continuing notion (in at least some
instances) of a broad discovery default principle.
First, amended Rule 26(b)(1) removes the nonexclusive
description of the type of information that is discoverable regarding
“any party’s claim or defense.”113 Former Rule 26(b)(1) provided, in
part, as follows:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s
claim or defense—including the existence, description,
nature, custody, condition, and location of any
documents or other tangible things and the identity and
location of persons who know of any discoverable
matter.114
The italicized language above has been removed from the
2015 version of Rule 26(b)(1). The relevant portion of the 2015
Committee Note indicates that this excision removes textual material
that has been rendered extraneous by common use and understanding,
noting that discovery of this information is “so deeply entrenched in
practice that it is no longer necessary to clutter the long text of Rule
112. See supra notes 43–48, and accompanying text.
113. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra
note 13, at B-42 to B-43.
114. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2014) (emphasis added).
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26 with these examples.”115 Immediately thereafter, however, the
Committee Note indicates a discovery-limiting effect of the
amendment—the Note provides that discovery of this “deeply
entrenched” matter “should still be permitted” when “relevant and
proportional to the needs of the case.”116 Thus, the removal of this
language both makes discovery of this matter subject to the
proportionality analysis and eliminates textual material courts might
have relied on in determining whether discovery meets the new
proportionality requirement. This amendment, again, underscores that
proportionality is the key determinant of discoverable information and
reinforces the perception that the text of Rule 26(b)(1) provides little
guidance to judges in making the proportionality decision.117
Second, amended Rule 26(b)(1) likewise eliminates the
“reasonably calculated” language, which currently provides that
parties may discover information that “appears reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”118 The full provision
states: “Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the
discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.”119 Amended Rule 26(b)(1) removes this
“reasonably calculated” qualifier. The 2015 version of Rule 26(b)(1),
as discussed above, requires that discoverable matter be relevant, nonprivileged, and proportional to the needs of the case.120 The Rule
removes the ability to obtain material that “appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” and
provides, instead, that information that is determined to be
discoverable—i.e., that is relevant, non-privileged, and within the new
scope of proportional discovery—“need not be admissible in evidence

115. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-43.
116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. See Genetin, supra note 24, at 1119–20 (discussing, in the context of
proposed amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 regarding summary
judgment, that guidance in the text of the Federal Rules is important to consistent
application of the Rules).
118. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2014).
119. Id. This language was added to Rule 26(b)(1) in 1948. See FED. R. CIV.
P. 26(b) 1948 advisory committee’s note.
120. See supra notes 85–87, and accompanying text.
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to be discoverable.”121 The first version of the “reasonably
calculated” language was added to Rule 26(b) in 1946, with the stated
purpose to “make clear the broad scope” of discovery.122 The
amendment, by contrast, reinforces restrictions on discoverable
information.
Third, amended Rule 26(b)(1) eliminates textual Rule
recognition of the ability of parties, upon a showing of good cause, to
obtain discovery relevant to “the subject matter involved in the
pending action,” thus limiting discovery to information that is relevant
to “any party’s claim or defense.”123 Although rarely invoked in the
years since, discovery of material relevant to “subject matter” was
removed from information automatically available for discovery,124
this provision for obtaining “subject matter” discovery upon a
showing of good cause was originally designed by the Advisory
Committee “to involve the court more actively in regulating the
breadth of sweeping or contentious discovery.”125 Retention of the
parties’ ability to obtain discovery relevant to the subject matter of the
action seems to fully support newly amended Rule 26(b)(1)’s
increased emphasis on both case-responsive discovery and more
active judicial management of the discovery process. Nevertheless,
the Advisory Committee indicates that discovery of material relevant
to the parties’ “claims and defenses” should be sufficient, “given a
proper understanding of what is relevant to a claim or defense.”126 The
exclusion of “subject matter” discovery, thus, eliminates express
textual authority to exercise discretion to extend discovery to meet the
needs of a particular case, while the inclusion of the proportionality
factors underscores textual authority to limit discovery.
121. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13,
at B-30 to B-31.
122. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2014) & 1948 advisory committee’s note.
123. Prior to the amendment, Rule 26(b)(1) provided that “[f]or good cause,
the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved
in the action.” This language has been removed from Rule 26(b)(1). FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(1); Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-30 to B-31.
124. See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.
125. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-9; see also Rowe,
supra note 64, at 16–17.
126. Id. at B-43. See also Rowe, supra note 64, at 20–21, 24–27, 29–30
(concluding, shortly after promulgation of Rule amendments precluding “subject
matter” discovery absent a motion and showing of good cause, that there was little
evidence that the amendment had narrowed discovery appreciably and suggesting
factors that might account for the limited impact).
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In summary, the text of amended Rule 26(b)(1), with its
adoption of a proportionality principle and its excision or restriction
of other textual provisions, reveals that the transition away from the
default of broad and liberal discovery in federal procedure is
complete. Indeed, three amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) remove or
revise language in the previous Rule 26(b)(1) and provide further
evidence of discovery limits. It may be that the elephant in the Rule
and Committee Note is an inclination toward—but not a default
principle of—more limited discovery, a goal that has driven changes
to the scope of Rule 26(b)(1) discovery provisions since 1983.
IV.

PROPORTIONALITY
FEDERAL COURTS

AND THE

INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY

OF

Absent meaningful direction in the text or Committee Note of
Rule 26(b)(1),127 a district court judge must engage in case-specific
balancing of the factors set forth in the Rule. The rulemakers
purposefully included a wide variety of factors that should be
considered in crafting proportional discovery. They also declined, in
both the Rule text and Committee Note, to provide significant
guidelines regarding application of most of these factors.128 This
proportionality amendment might be optimal for decision makers
who: (1) gather all information relevant to the scope of discovery
decisions; (2) invite or require participation by the range of relevant
stakeholders; (3) spend resources and time assessing results and
comparing alternatives; and (4) make normative policy decisions
regarding the substantive claims at issue. These characteristics,
however, do not describe federal district court judges, magistrate
127. Some judges would not consider Committee Notes, though the Supreme
Court frequently references them. See, e.g., Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of
Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
1099, 1141–42, 1152–69 (2002) (noting that proposed Committee Notes go through
notice-and-comment review along with proposed Rule text, and advocating that
material in the Committee Notes be accorded “authoritative weight” in interpreting
Federal Rules).
128. See infra notes 151–160, and accompanying text, for an analysis of the
guidance provided in the text of Rule 26(b)(1) and the Committee Note.
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judges, or their assistants who resolve pretrial issues in particular
cases.
Indeed, Professor David Marcus has recognized that transsubstantive, rather than case-specific, process law helps to
“ameliorate[] . . . institutional limitations” of federal courts arising
from limits on their “legitimacy, competency, and effectiveness” in
creating substance-specific procedure.129 Trans-substantive process
law would include the textual and background principle of liberal
discovery across cases, which was a premise of the original discovery
rules and which supplied clear direction to judges making scope-ofdiscovery decisions. In the current litigation context, many accept that
broad discovery in all cases is not optimal. Courts nevertheless
require some guidance. Professor Robert Bone has concluded that
when the Federal Rules delegate discretion to judges through multifactor balancing tests, rulemakers should provide guidance by limiting
the available factors, identifying principles that guide decision
making, or both.130 Such guidance would counterbalance the
institutional impediments that district court judges will encounter in
making case-specific, scope-of-discovery decisions using the multifactor proportionality standard. In this Part, I briefly review the
institutional impediments of federal courts that work to prevent good,
case-specific decisions regarding proportional discovery, suggest
means of ameliorating these institutional deficits, and conclude that
Congress and the Advisory Committee are better suited,
institutionally, to make these decisions.131
129. Marcus, supra note 21, at 1220.
130. Bone, supra note 21, at 2015–16; Bone, supra note 18, at 300–03; see
also Burbank, supra note 45, at 1473–74 (suggesting that courts should recognize
that procedural rules are not neutral and should explicitly identify their impact).
131. See generally infra Section IV.A.1. See also Burbank & Subrin, supra
note 10, at 412 (recommending that the Advisory Committee, in conjunction with
plaintiffs’ and defendants’ attorneys, fashion discovery protocols for various
substantive claims, and suggesting that the Advisory Committee probably has the
authority to do so under the Rules Enabling Act and, if not, recommending that
Congress should delegate that authority); see also Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen
Staszewski, The Supreme Court’s Regulation of Civil Procedure: Lessons from
Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1188, 1194–1215 (2012) (comparing the
institutional competencies of the Supreme Court in its adjudicatory capacity and in
its rulemaking capacity and concluding that rulemaking is the superior policymaking
tool in most circumstances because it is better suited to making policy, obtaining
information, permitting broad participation, determining necessary tradeoffs, and
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Institutional Limits of District Courts
1.

Limited Normative Decision
Making Authority

Federal district court judges have limited substantive
lawmaking authority as compared to state lawmakers (including state
courts) and their political counterparts at the federal level. When
determining discovery scope under the proportionality analysis,
however, district court judges will be required to make numerous
normative judgments on a regular basis. As indicated above, the
individual proportionality factors include elements requiring policy
decisions, and the ultimate balance of individual factors will require
additional normative trade-offs and value choices.132
The first and second factors are among the proportionality
factors that will require normative decision making and will affect the
parties’ ability to succeed on different substantive claims.133 The first
factor requires a judge to determine the importance of the issues and
will include normative line-drawing regarding the importance of the
issue to the parties and society. The second factor requires the judge
to determine importance based on the monetary value of the claim at
issue, which also requires a judge to set value-based boundaries.
creating comprehensive solutions); Struve, supra note 130, at 1141–42, 1152–69
(noting that proposed Committee Notes go through notice–and–comment review
along with proposed Rule text and advocating that material in the Committee Notes
be accorded “authoritative weight” in interpreting Federal Rules).
132. See supra notes 93–101, and accompanying text; see also Burbank,
supra note 99, at 650–51; Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 96, at 12–18; Moss,
supra note 62, at 896 (in making the proportionality calculation, judges must
consider both value to the parties and to society).
133. See generally supra Section III.A.2. Additionally, even assuming that
the judge could obtain adequate information to determine an issue’s importance to
both the parties and society, (which I explore below—see infra notes 142–145)
judicial policymaking will not end with the judge’s determination of the issue’s
importance, but will recur as the judge makes further decisions essential to the
proportionality decision, including whether the amount in controversy (factor 2)
outweighs the issue’s importance; the extent of discovery to provide parties (often
plaintiffs) in instances of “information asymmetry” (factor 3); whether the parties’
resources (factor 4) justify more or less discovery; and whether the burden or
expense of discovery (factor 6) outweighs its likely benefit.
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Other factors, too, will require normative decision making. Factor
three, for example, which assesses the extent of parties’ access to
relevant information and focuses on cases of information asymmetry,
will inevitably involve a trade-off between one party’s (typically, the
plaintiff’s) ability to obtain sufficient discovery to prove a claim and
the opposition’s discovery costs. These factors implicate the limited
lawmaking authority of district court judges.
The decisions may, at the same time, encroach on the
substantive policy choices of Congress or the states to use private
adjudication (often in conjunction with administrative enforcement)
to enforce substantive policy.134 For example, Congress has created
private attorney general provisions in many statutes and has also
induced suit through attorney fee provisions and enhanced damages
awards.135 These provisions represent Congress’s determination that
the social benefit of enforcing the claim at issue exceeds the private
benefit and cost of litigation for the individual parties.136 Judicial
decisions to limit discovery in these cases could encroach on both the
policy decisions of Congress and the civil enforcement methods

134. See e.g., Burbank & Farhang, supra note 45, at 1545, 1547–50 (“[T]he
choice of private over administrative enforcement may afford protection to
congressional policy long after the governing majority has been replaced by
legislators with different preferences.”); Burbank, Farhang, & Kritzer, supra note
12, at 640, 644–47 (providing historical background of the increase in federal
statutory and administrative law and observing that the increase coincided with “the
federal government’s reliance on private enforcement” ).
135. See e.g., Subrin, supra note 12, at 395–97 (arguing that trans-substantive
procedures are not the best fit for the United States); Burbank, Farhang & Kritzer
supra note 12, at 640 (concluding that “the desirability of authorizing private actions
involves difficult policy judgments and is likely to depend on a number of contextspecific factors” and that “[m]aking such determinations therefore requires
familiarity with the nature of the particular policy problem, the substantive goals of
the regulatory scheme, and the likely interaction of private lawsuits with other
elements of the government’s enforcement strategy”).
136. See, e.g., Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 96, at 3 (asserting that courts
determining the proportionality of discovery should consider “the divergence
between social and private benefits of discovery, e.g., in litigation with important
precedential or social value that will not be internalized by the litigants”); Burbank,
supra note 99, at 651 (concluding that one of the social benefits of private
enforcement, pursuant to congressional legislation, is the avoidance of the huge
“expenditures, higher taxes, and bureaucratic state-building that are essential to
adequate public enforcement.”).
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selected by Congress.137 Commentators emphasize, moreover, that
congressional decisions to pursue substantive goals through private
enforcement often include concurrent decisions not to fund alternative
public means of enforcing the claims through increased taxes.138
Consequently, when making proportionality decisions, district
courts must calculate and weigh the private and social benefits and
costs. These calculations will not be easy to make in the context of
particular cases; the decisions could involve decisions contrary to
those of Congress and state policymakers; and such decisions will
often require information that will be unavailable to the parties and the
judge.
2.

Lack of Access to Information

Judges, who must rely to a large extent on information from
the parties, will often lack access to the information necessary to make
informed decisions when implementing the proportionality
standard.139 The litigation process thus compares less favorably to
137. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 26, at 927 (discussing the limitations of case–
specific rule–making); Burbank, Farhang & Kritzer, supra note 12, at 648
(indicating that “those with the power to determine the efficacy of private
enforcement regimes in action may subvert the policy preferences of the enacting
Congress”); Moss, supra note 62, at 896; Subrin, supra note 12, at 395–97
(concluding that “‘[c]alibration of discovery is calibration of the level of
enforcement of the social policy set by Congress’” (quoting Patrick Higginbotham,
Foreword, 49 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1997)).
138. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 99, at 651–52; Burbank & Farhang, supra
note 45, at 1547–49; Carrington, supra note 9, at 603–06 (concluding that “[a] nation
that often eschews the idea of strong or intrusive government may require
[statutorily granted suits by private citizens]. . . to constrain harmful business
practices”); Subrin, supra note 12, at 387, 396–97.
139. See Bone, supra note 21, at 1986–2001 (discussing “bounded rationality
constraints, information access obstacles, and strategic interaction effects” as
obstacles to a district court judge’s effective “exercise of discretion”); Robert G.
Bone, Securing the Normative Foundations of Litigation Reform, 86 B.U. L. REV.
1155, 1170 (2006) (registering skepticism about delegating broad discretion to
district court judges, based on doubts that judges “can gather and process the
information necessary to craft case–specific procedures that produce good outcomes
in the highly strategic environment of litigation”); Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading
and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L. REV. 535, 537, 561 (2009)
(concluding that the Supreme Court, in the context of judicial interpretation, “is ill
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other institutions that have broader authority to request or require
provision of information, such as Congress and the federal rulemakers
acting under the Rules Enabling Act.
Further, parties themselves often lack complete information in
the context of litigating particular cases, thus limiting the judge’s
ability to make sound normative decisions. Additionally, parties have
incentives to withhold information,140 further limiting the information
available to the judge when making complex determinations under the
proportionality standard. Moreover, parties will benefit most from
withholding information early in the case and before the opposing
party has the ability to obtain that information through discovery.141
This is precisely the time that the judge formulates his or her initial
views and makes case management and discovery decisions that often
dictate the case’s course. Indeed, because the 2015 amendments to
the Federal Rules also encourage earlier sharing of information and
earlier judicial case management, incentives to withhold information
early in the case could be intensified. In addition, early discovery
decisions made on the incomplete information available to the judge
will impact later stages of the litigation, including the strength of the
parties’ positions at settlement, summary judgment, and trial.142

equipped to gather the range of empirical data, and lacks the practical experience . . .
that [is] implicated in considering standards for the adequacy of pleadings”);
Marcus, supra note 21, at 1222–1233 (reviewing trans-substantivity and judicial
upkeep or process law); Singer, supra note 12, at 183 (discussing the institutional
limitations that prevent courts from “legitimately, competently, and effectively
designing substance-specific process law”).
140. See Bone, supra note 21, at 1990–91, 1993 (noting that withholding
information is advantageous to parties because it both requires other parties to incur
costs in obtaining the information and it prolongs any existing information
asymmetry); Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 96, at 14–15 (noting, regarding the
access to information factor, that it may be difficult for judges to gauge the extent
of the producing party’s access to information and that requesting parties will have
incentives to understate ability to obtain information or to exaggerate the costs of
obtaining it).
141 . Bone, supra note 21, at 1990; Moss, supra note 62, at 896.
142. Bone, supra note 21, at 1993; Bone, supra note 26, at 927; see also Moss,
supra note 62, at 910–12 (concluding that court decisions regarding proportionality
are “doomed to be suboptimal” because, inter alia, in applying the proportionality
standard, courts must consider the probative value of evidence, the size of the case,
and the likelihood that plaintiff will prevail at trial, but courts cannot make a good
evaluation of the likelihood of success at trial until they obtain the evidence at issue).
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Moreover, some information crucial to making a good
decision under the proportionality standard will not be in the
possession of the parties. This includes information regarding the
social costs and benefits of claims created by Congress and other
decision makers. For this type of information, it could be crucial to
obtain participation of other stakeholders, but litigation provides few
opportunities to invite or require broad participation.
Even if judges could obtain complete information, however,
they would still suffer from a comparative inability to conduct
empirical assessment of the information, compare their discovery
limits to other alternatives, and use that information to inform ultimate
proportionality decisions.143 Absent sufficient time, information, and
resources to assess the information empirically, judges will likely
resort to schemas and heuristics that introduce bias into their decision
making.144 Moreover, because a single judge acts as the decision
maker in trials, there are not structural checks and balances that could
lessen the effect of bias.145
Finally, case-specific application of the proportionality
standard will require enormous costs in terms of judicial time and
effort for results that, given information access and assessment
limitations, will not be optimal and will result in disuniformity of
discovery procedure across the federal system.
3.

Little Opportunity for Meaningful Appellate
Review

The nature of appellate review in federal courts will also
ensure little opportunity for meaningful review of district court
decisions implementing the proportionality standard. Appellate
review generally supplies corrective oversight and instruction
regarding controlling legal principles. Additionally, for issues subject

143. Marcus, supra note 21, at 1230; see also Bone, supra note 21, at 1986–
87 (discussing the issues broad discretion creates).
144. Bone, supra note 18, at 301, 307–08; Bone, supra note 21, at 1987–90;
Marcus, supra note 21, at 1230.
145. Bone, supra note 21, at 1989–90; Marcus, supra note 21, at 1231.
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to an abuse of discretion standard, appellate review may, over time,
provide guidance by narrowing the scope of permissible discretion.146
The appellate court’s ability to provide error correction and
guidance regarding the application of the proportionality standard in
discovery rulings, however, will be diminished. First, review will
often not be available. Discovery issues, which are rarely subject to
immediate appeal, will often fade in importance as the case progresses
and will not be appealed. Second, many cases settle, precluding
appeal of even important proportionality issues. Third, even if a case
is appealed on the application of the proportionality standard, the
district court’s proportionality decision will typically be reviewed
under the abuse of discretion standard, which triggers the appellate
court’s substantial deference to the district court’s determinations.
These general constraints will limit the opportunity for appellate
courts to compare various proportionality decisions from the
laboratory of the district courts, to identify stronger decisions, and to
impose a level of consistency or uniformity in proportionality
decisions.
Moreover, in the event that a party successfully appeals a
proportionality standard issue, the appellate court’s review will be
limited by the district court’s record. That is, the reviewing court’s
decision will be impacted by the following limitations on the district
court: lack of access to complete information, parties’ incentives to
withhold information, and inadequate resources to assess the
information provided. These constraints will, in turn, impede the
ability of appellate courts to provide corrective review or guidance
regarding proportionality issues. Finally, federal appellate courts, like
district courts, have limited substantive lawmaking ability. Thus,
appellate decisions, like district court decisions, may encroach upon
the substantive policy decisions of Congress or other decision makers.
B.

Moving Forward with Proportionality

Notwithstanding the institutional obstacles that district courts
and other decision makers will confront in applying the
proportionality standard, courts will need to apply the standard
regularly. In this Part, I conclude that in the short term, district courts
should defer to the pre-existing policy choices of Congress and other
146. Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1561, 1568 (2003).
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decision makers regarding substantive claims and to the limited
guidance in Rule 26(b)(1) and in the Committee Note. In the long
term, the Advisory Committee should reclaim the issue of
proportionality in discovery and provide guidance by creating general
discovery procedures to cover the broad run of cases and substancespecific protocols to govern specific substantive claims.
In the short term, district courts should conclude that their
discretion in creating discovery that is proportionate to the substantive
claims at issue is limited. Courts should resolve proportionality issues
against the backdrop of the values underlying the applicable
substantive law and in light of the values furthered by the judicial
system. Though the American judicial system promotes many values,
one of the most important is the goal of resolving cases in accord with
the substantive rights of the parties.147 Thus, in implementing the
proportionality standard, courts should determine and enforce the
policy objectives of Congress and other lawmakers. The choices of
other decision makers will not provide definitive guidance regarding
resolution of all discovery disputes, but they will provide background
principles to guide decisions in some segments of cases. Moreover,
furthering the existing normative choices of Congress and other
decision makers when making proportionality decisions parallels the
federal courts’ role, when adjudicating disputes, of enforcing the
values underlying authoritative texts or otherwise existing in
practice.148 District courts, thus, should make discovery decisions that
do not undermine the value choices in existing substantive law.
147. E.g., Bone, supra note 18, at 302; Bone, supra note 26, at 913–14.
148. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085
(1984) (concluding that the role of judges and other court decision makers “is not to
maximize the ends of private parties, nor simply to secure the peace, but to explicate
and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution
and statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord with them”);
accord Bone, supra note 18, at 302–03 (“[P]rivate dispute resolution is not the
primary goal of procedure under any sensible account of American civil
adjudication. . . . It is meant to enforce the substantive law, and the substantive law
is meant to further public goals such as deterring socially undesirable behavior and
providing morally justified compensation.”); see also Bone, supra note 26, at 940–
43, 949 (concluding that both a “rights–based metric” and a “process–based metric”
for determining procedural issues would support the argument that procedural
rulemakers should make procedural choices by referring to existing practice of
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Adherence to normative preferences of other policymakers is
also consistent with the Advisory Committee’s statement that, in the
“importance of the issue” factor, the district courts should consider
“philosophic, social, or institutional” concerns and that some
substantive claims will “vindicate vitally important personal or public
values.”149 But there is a caveat. It would require judges to promote
the existing protections for substantive claims,150 rather than to
substitute their own normative choices. It would also require judges to
determine, to the extent possible, how those substantive preferences
play into the necessary cost–benefit analysis of the proportionality
standard and, further, how those preferences may guide on-the-ground
discovery disputes such as the number of permissible depositions,
scope of permissible document requests, and sequence of discovery.
District courts should also consider any guidance provided in
the text of the Rule or Advisory Committee Notes.151 The text of Rule
26(b)(1), as discussed above, provides little direct guidance. The
rulemakers did, however, place the “importance of the issues” factor
first, to underscore the importance of that factor and to prevent any
conclusion that the amount in controversy was the most important
factor.152 The Committee Note similarly emphasizes the “significance

protection for substantive values, and concluding that court–based, committee–
centered rulemakers would fare better at the exercise than judges exercising
discretion in the context of particular cases); Robert M. Cover, For James Wm.
Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 735 (1975);
Marcus, supra note 21, at 1238–39 (positing that courts might vary from a trans–
substantive standard to create substance–specific procedure if the more specific rule
would support “the policy objectives . . . of an antecedent regime”).
149. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-8, B-41 to B-42; see
also supra notes 94–99, and accompanying text.
150. Bone, supra note 142, at 1162. See also Bone, supra note 26, at 935–37,
951–52 (concluding that in measuring outcome, in a rights-based court-rulemaking
model, the procedural rulemakers should “construct from existing practice a
coherent general theory of value that fits and justifies the pattern of protection given
to interests by the legal system as a whole”); Marcus, supra note 21, at 1228–30
(indicating that when judges make substance-specific procedure, they should do so
to support policies in existing law, i.e., to support “an antecedent regime’s policy
objectives,” in order to avoid establishing their own policy preferences and
exceeding their lawmaking authority).
151. Struve, supra note 130, at 1141–42, 1152–69.
152. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13,
at B-8, B-41 to B-42 (internal quotations omitted).
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of the substantive issues.”153 Here, the Advisory Committee
recognized that “many cases in public policy spheres, such as
employment practices, free speech, and other matters may have
importance far beyond the monetary amount involved” and that a
number of other substantive areas may present cases seeking little or
nothing of monetary value.154 The Committee Note, thus, may be read
to imply that the courts are not to make their own value choices, but
are to promote the value choices in existing law.
Additionally, the Committee Note reveals little purpose to
reduce discovery costs through proportionality, but instead proposes
to seek greater coincidence between claims and discovery.155
Likewise, consistent empirical evidence reveals that discovery costs
are not excessive except in a small set of complex cases.156 The lack
of purpose to address radical imbalances in discovery costs also
supports the notion that district courts should seek to further
substantive policy choices of superior normative decision makers.
Acting at the boundaries of their lawmaking authority and without
evidence of excessive discovery costs in the majority of cases, district
courts should exercise restraint in limiting discovery in areas where
Congress or other policymakers have created favored claims.
The text of Rule 26(b)(1) and the Committee Note also
provides some guidance regarding cases involving “information
asymmetry.”157 Rule 26(b)(1) includes a new factor—“the parties’
relative access to relevant information.”158 This factor was included
to highlight the issue where “[o]ne party—often an individual
plaintiff—may have very little discoverable information,” while the
opposing party may have a substantial amount of information.159 In
these circumstances, the Committee Note advises courts that, “the
153. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-8, B-41 to B-42
(internal quotations omitted).
154. Id. at B-41 to B-42.
155. Id.
156. Id. at B-6 to B-7.
157. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13,
at B-40.
158. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13,
at B-30.
159. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-40 to B-46.

698

THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION

[Vol. 34:4

burden of responding to discovery [will] lie[] heavier” on the party
with more information in most cases.160 District courts should follow
this guidance.
In addition to deferring to existing substantive policy choices
and to guidance in the Rule and Committee Note, courts should
provide rulings that make clear the rationale of their proportionality
decisions. Articulating the reasons underlying proportionality
decisions will serve several purposes. First, since lawmaking is
commonly incremental, clarity regarding the basis for opinions will
permit the development of a body of law regarding proper
interpretation and application of the proportionality factors, which
may be critical given the likely lack of appellate guidance. Thus,
district courts may, given the narrow opportunity for review of
discovery issues, be critical actors in creating the law governing
proportionality in discovery and in developing principles from which
the Advisory Committee may be able to craft more helpful normative
guidelines, create more helpful balancing factors, and provide clarity
regarding priority of balancing factors. Second, decisions that clearly
indicate the bases for proportionality rulings would also provide a
body of law for appellate courts to consider in the limited
circumstances in which proportionality issues reach appellate review.
Third, transparency of the rationale for proportionality decisions
would help ensure that the district judges obtain the best information
possible and rely on that information, rather than resorting to judicial
intuition, heuristics, and schemas.161 Fourth, providing the reasoning
underlying decisions would also help ensure that district courts adhere
to the existing policy choices of superior policymakers, rather than
substituting their own choices. Explicit rationale for proportionality
decisions would, thus, enhance the legitimacy of courts’
proportionality decisions. Indeed, in other instances in which district
courts act at the boundaries of their authority—such as Rule 56,
regarding summary judgment; Rule 65, regarding injunctions; and
Rule 23, regarding class action certification—procedural rules have

160. Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 13, at B-41.
161. See Bone, supra note 21, at 1986–90 (explaining obstacles to effective
exercise of procedural discretion).
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required or practice has provided more transparent decision
making.162
Fifth, a primary justification for court-made procedural
rulemaking under the Rules Enabling Act, despite its inevitable impact
on substantive rights, is its foundation in reasoned deliberation.163 To
the extent the proportionality standard substitutes case-specific
judicial discretion regarding proportionality for committee-based,
predetermined discovery standards,164 court opinions, too, should
reveal the grounds for the decisions. Indeed, commentators have
suggested that even the Supreme Court, as Congress’s expressly
delegated rule maker, should pay close attention to existing law when
promulgating rules and should provide a clear statement of the
162. See Marcus, supra note 21, at 1241 (suggesting that rules promote
reasoned deliberation); accord Sarah M. R. Cravens, Judging Discretion: Contexts
for Understanding the Role of Judgment, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 947, 981–82 (2010)
(indicating that the judge’s explicit reasoning regarding the “process, the inputs, and
the challenges” in ruling on a motion for an injunction as well as on each required
factor for the injunction permits judicial flexibility, but also provides an “effective
constraint on individual judgment in decisionmaking”); Frederick Schauer, Giving
Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 651–56 (1995). See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1).
Accord Adamson, supra note 26, at 1045 (noting that FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1), which
requires district courts to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law in actions
tried without a jury or with an advisory jury and for interlocutory injunctions,
reinforces the trial court’s superiority in finding facts and the appellate court’s
superiority in norm declaration and norm elaboration). See also FED. R. CIV. P.
23(c)(1) (requiring that a court must “determine by order whether to certify the
action as a class action” and specifying that the order must “define the class, the
class claims, issues, or defenses, and appoint class counsel”); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)
(amended in 2010 to include a new directive that the court “should state on the
record the reasons for granting or denying” a motion for summary judgment, which
the accompanying Committee Note indicated accorded with practice already
implemented by most courts).
163. See Bone, supra note 26, at 940–41, 951–52 (suggesting that rulemakers
creating rules through the rulemaking process should use reasoned deliberation to
create Rules that promote a set of legal principles that do not “deviate too much from
existing practice”); Bone, supra note 142, at 1160–63; Cover, supra note 151, at
734–36; Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 134, at 1246–51; Struve, supra note
130, at 1110–14.
164. Bone, supra note 26, at 917–18, 926–29, 951–52; see also Struve, supra
note 130, at 1119–20, 1120 n.72 (suggesting that district courts should have less
discretion to interpret rules).

700

THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION

[Vol. 34:4

grounds for its procedural rulemaking choices.165 The rule makers’
articulation of reasoning is critical to compliance with the Rules
Enabling Act, which provides that rules enacted pursuant to the Act
“shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.”166
Reasoned decision making assists in legitimizing the federal rule
makers’ procedural choices and rule makers’ discretion because it
reveals their substantive choices, reveals the extent to which
rulemakers adhered to existing normative decisions of Congress, and
permits Congress to change the procedural choices in particular cases
if it deems change necessary.167 Because the Advisory Committee has
declined, in Rule 26(b)(1), to make normative choices and has instead
delegated those choices to district courts, the district courts should
justify their case-specific choices under the proportionality standard
by articulating the reasons for their proportionality decisions.
Further, because appellate review will be relatively rare, it
might also be beneficial for district courts to flag their proportionality
decisions for study by the Federal Judicial Center and other
commentators. Such a study could provide the legitimacy-enhancing
benefits discussed above while also helping to provide a measure of
uniformity and systemic coherence—two procedural values that are
sacrificed when rule makers authorize case-specific discretion.
In the long term, however, the Advisory Committee should
return to the issue of proportional discovery and should provide
additional guidance regarding application of the proportionality
factors or should create (1) uniform general discovery standards for
most cases and (2) substance-specific discovery protocols for
recurring substantive claims that often present difficult discovery
issues.168 Indeed, the Federal Judicial Center’s October 2015 report
165. Bone, supra note 26, at 950–52; Bone, supra note 142, at 1159; Cover,
supra note 151, at 734–40; Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 134, at 1247–51.
166. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012).
167. Bone, supra note 26, at 950–51; Bone, supra note 142, at 1157–59;
Cover, supra note 151, at 734–36.
168. See, e.g., Burbank & Subrin, supra note 10, at 409–12 (suggesting a
“simple case” track with limited discovery for cases under a certain dollar amount,
with little opportunity for litigants to alter the limits by agreement or court order,
which would be supplemented by substance-specific protocols for case types that
engender burdensome discovery); Subrin, supra note 1, at 28–29, 45–56; Subrin,
supra note 12, at 399–405; see also Bone, supra note 21, at 1994–96 (contending
that general discovery rules and substance–specific discovery protocols, which
provide discretion for trial courts to vary from the established norms in special cases,
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on the Pilot Project Regarding Initial Discovery Protocols for
Employment Cases Alleging Adverse Action provides support for
further exploration of pattern discovery protocols.169 The Advisory
Committee, acting in concert with plaintiffs’ attorneys, defendants’
attorneys, and other relevant stakeholders, would enjoy institutional
advantages unavailable to district court judges acting in the context of
particular cases. Through the rulemaking process of the Rules
Enabling Act,170 the Advisory Committee, which is composed of a
range of lawyers and judges,171 can and does invite broad participation
in rulemaking activities. It gives notice of proposed rules, provides
opportunity for comment on rule proposals, and holds public
hearings.172 The Advisory Committee may also obtain empirical
assessments in support of proposed rules, and its proposed rules are
subject to multiple layers of review.173
would be superior to delegating case–specific discretion to judges); Gensler &
Rosenthal, supra note 33, at 650–51, 654–57 (supporting proportionality balancing
but suggesting supplementation by use of “scheme–based” protocols).
169. Emery G. Lee III and Jason A. Cantone, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
REPORT ON PILOT PROJECT REGARDING INITIAL DISCOVERY PROTOCOLS FOR
EMPLOYMENT CASES ALLEGING ADVERSE ACTION 1 (2015) (comparing cases by
federal judges who voluntarily adopted the discovery protocols and those who did
not and concluding, inter alia, (1) motions to dismiss and for summary judgment
were “less likely to be filed” in cases under the protocols; (2) the average number of
discovery motions filed in cases under the protocols was about half that of the
comparison cases; (3) it appeared that cases under the protocols were more likely to
settle but the time to settlement was not faster; and (4) there was “no statistically
significant difference in case processing times” between the two sets of cases).
170. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–2074 (2012).
171. 28 U.S.C. §2073(a)(2) (2012).
172. Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM.
U. L. REV. 1655, 1672 (1995).
173. The Judicial Conference, which is assisted by a Standing Committee and
five advisory committees, including the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, takes the lead in the Rule amendment process. Proposed rules
are considered first by the appropriate advisory committee and are, thereafter, sent
to the Standing Committee. If approved by the Standing Committee, the proposed
Rule is sent to the Judicial Conference for approval. The Judicial Conference
transmits approved rules to the Supreme Court, which has seven months to review
and transmit the Rule to Congress. Congress then has seven months in which to
delay, amend, or veto the proposals. Absent such action by Congress, a proposed
Rule takes effect. See Struve, supra note 130, at 1103–19, 1140 (suggesting that
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The rulemaking process, therefore, provides better access to
information, greater resources to aid in empirical assessment of
information obtained, broader participation by relevant members of
the legal community and public, and multiple tiers of review. General
discovery limits and substance-specific discovery protocols created
through this rulemaking process would provide ample room for
judicial discretion but would also provide for better, more-informed
rules, sharpened guidance to district court judges, and heightened
uniformity across the federal system. Such rulemaking, though
creating some substance-specific procedural rules, is likely within the
Court’s rulemaking authority under the Rules Enabling Act.174 If it is
not within the Court’s authority, however, commentators have
pragmatically suggested that Congress could either amend the Rules
Enabling Act to confer such authority, or it could directly enact the
proposed rules.175
V.

CONCLUSION

The 2015 amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) install largely
unguided proportionality balancing as the primary determinant of
discoverable information in the federal courts and also eliminate
textual provisions that favored broader discovery. The text of the
2015 amendment to Rule 26(b)(1) and the text of the Committee Note
provide some minimal guidance regarding the importance of the
proportionality factors, their weight, and their application, but the
Rule, in the main, remits these decisions to the parties and the district
rulemaking provides for greater deliberation than adjudication); see also Genetin,
supra note 35, at 689–90 (providing background of Rules Enabling Act).
174. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 142, at 1159–60 (emphasizing that Professor
Cover’s “deeper point” was that sometimes the justification for a procedural choice
“necessarily ha[s] to take account of substantive policies, and in such cases, judges
should explain their choices publicly and make the connection to substantive policy
explicit”); Bone, supra note 26, at 950–53 (discussing limits of court rulemaking);
Burbank, supra note 35, at 1124–25, 1193 (proposing that, ironically, changes to
rulemaking advanced under the Rules Enabling Act should come through
administrative law); Cover, supra note 151, at 734–36. But see, Joshua M. Koppel,
Comment, Tailoring Discovery: Using Non Trans-substantive Rules to Reduce
Waste and Abuse, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 243, 285–87 (2012) (questioning the Supreme
Court’s authority to promulgate substance-specific discovery rules and also
concluding that Congress is, as an institutional matter, better-suited to the task).
175. Burbank & Subrin, supra note 10, at 412.
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court judge or magistrate judge in the context of particular (perhaps
idiosyncratic) litigation. Although the proportionality standard
permits district courts to establish discovery that meets the needs of
each case, district courts face institutional challenges in creating casespecific procedure that trump the supposed benefits of determining
proportionality through case-specific balancing of listed factors.
Aiming for the outside corner of federal court authority, the
amendments came in wide of the mark. District court decision makers
are at a comparative disadvantage vis-à-vis the political branches and
the Advisory Committee in such endeavors because they have a
narrower range of lawmaking authority, have little ability to obtain
broad-based information or broad participation of relevant
stakeholders, and have limited resources to devote to evaluating
information, making normative predictions about future events, and
creating policy. Further, appellate courts will rarely review discovery
decisions. When they do, they too will be hindered by initial failures
of access to information by the district court and by lack of
policymaking authority.
I, thus, recommend that district courts promote, to the extent
possible, the normative preferences of Congress and other
policymakers, and defer to the admittedly limited guidance available
in the text of Rule 26(b)(1) and the Committee Note. I recommend as
well that district court decision makers articulate the reasons
underlying their proportionality decisions. I also join the chorus of
those suggesting that application of proportionality in discovery
would be better achieved by the Advisory Committee’s promulgating
discovery principles applicable to most cases and substance-specific
protocols uniformly applicable to particular substantive claims. If the
discovery zone is to be narrowed for some players in the litigation
game, rulemakers who can invite broad participation, access
comprehensive information, and obtain sophisticated assessment of
the information, should make those decisions on a system-wide basis.

